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Abstract 
Recent discussions about the microstructure of materials generally focus on the ontological 
aspects of the molecular structure. However, there are many types of substances that cannot be 
studied by means of the concept of molecule, for example, salts. For the quantum treatment of 
these substances, a new particle, called phonon, is introduced. Phonons are generally conceived 
as a pseudo-particle, that is, a mathematical device necessary to perform calculations but which 
does not have a "real" existence. In this context, the aim of this paper will be to analyze the 
ontological status of phonons. For such purposes we will critically analyze the arguments that 
would account for the presumed nonexistence of phonons. Finally, having already demonstrated 
that there are not enough reasons to consider phonons as non-existing entities, we will explore 
some possibilities that allow us to elucidate their ontological status. 
Keywords: Phonons, Quantum Chemistry, Intertheoretical Relationships, Ontological 
Commitments, Pluralism.  
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The study of intertheoretical relationships is of particular relevance to the philosophy of 
chemistry, due to the fact that the close relationships between chemistry and physics affect the 
independence and autonomy of chemistry as a scientific discipline. The influence that physics has 
exerted on chemistry from a position of supposed hegemony is manifested, for example, in the 
modern explanations of the chemical bond proposed since the advent of quantum mechanics in 
the first half of the twentieth century. These explanations led Dirac to declare in 1929 that 
quantum mechanics already possessed the power to account for the fundamental principles of 
chemistry. However, the issue of the effective reduction of chemistry to physics has been much 
discussed recently by authors such as Eric Scerri (2000, 2011, 2012, 2013), Robin Hendry 2010, 
Hinne Hettema 2012, Lombardi (2005, 2014), among many others. The main antireductionist 
arguments stress that physics is incapable of explaining the structure of chemical substances. In 
particular, they focus on the incompatibility between the fundamental principles of quantum 
mechanics and the concept of molecular structure used in chemistry (Woolley 1978, 1982, 
Amann 1992, Sutcliffe and Woolley 2011, 2012, Bishop 2005, Fortin et al., 2017). However, it is 
important to bear in mind that molecules are not the only type of entities in chemistry; in order tot 
enrich the debate, it is essential to consider other types of chemical entities. One example is the 
case of salts, which are understood not as “large” molecules, but as a network; as we will explain 
in Section 2, this is a concept completely different from the concept of molecule. As a 
consequence, although the present work will not specifically delve into the reductionism-anti-
reductionist discussion, it will provide new elements for de debate by introducing arguments for 
the consolidation of the ontological existence of phonons. 
Phonons are particles that are appealed to for the quantum treatment of salts. However, 
phonons are commonly conceived as pseudo-particles. In general, a phonon is considered a 
mathematical device necessary to perform calculations, but without “real” existence. Some 
authors classify phonons as quasi-particles, that is, as non-elementary particles that, although can 
be reduced, on a limited time scale behave as if they were elementary particles (Ladyman 2015).  
In this context, the aim of this paper consists in analyzing the ontological status of phonons 
in the light of the usual arguments by means of which their real existence is denied. For this 
purpose, in Section 2, we will briefly summarize the way in which salts are traditionally studied; 
we will point out that, in order to account for certain phenomena, mainly thermal acoustic, it is 
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necessary to introduce the concept of phonon. In Section 3, we will briefly recall the empirical 
success that underlies the importance of the concept of phonon at an explanatory and predictive 
level. In Section 4, we will critically analyze the usual arguments against the real existence of 
phonons. On this basis, by establishing the analogy between phonons and photons, we will 
conclude that if the existence of photons is accepted, then the same attitude should be adopted in 
the case of phonons. Once it is admitted that there are not good reasons to consider phonons as 
non-existing entities, in Section 5 we will explore some perspectives that will allow us to 
elucidate their ontological status. Finally, in Section 6, we present our conclusions. 
2. The internal structure of crystalline solids. 
Substances in the solid state are commonly studied in a different way from how their liquid or 
gaseous counterparts are treated, mainly due to the magnitude of their components at the 
molecular level. For example, a macroscopic crystal can very well be described in terms of a 
single structural unit that extends through the entire crystal. Crystalline materials, as the salts, are 
those solid substances which distinctive feature is that their basic structural units have a long-
term periodic arrangement. 
2.1. The classical description of a crystalline solid. 
For conciseness, we will introduce two simplifications that will not harm in any way the 
conclusions we will arrive at in this work, since the generalization to more complex systems 
without much difficulty is always possible. On the one hand, we will consider only the so-called 
monatomic crystals, that is, crystalline solids whose units are composed of a single atom. On the 
other hand, although a real crystal is understood as a perfectly ordered network in three 
dimensions, here we will consider only models in one dimension. 
The simplest model of a crystalline solid is a one-dimensional infinite chain of atoms 
interconnected by some kind of interaction. Since the chain is infinite and all its links are 
identical atoms, the chain has a discrete translation symmetry. In turn, by assuming the principle 
of indifference, the constituent atoms are considered as equidistant in the state of equilibrium. In 
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this model, when an atom is moved away from its equilibrium position, then a restitutive force 
will appear on that atom that tends to return it to the equilibrium position. The simplest restitutive 
force is, as in a spring, proportional to the distance, F d∝ . If su  is the variable that represents 
the position of the particle s , and given that this particle is bound to its neighbors 1s +  and 1s − , 
then the force on it will be 
( ) ( )1 1s s s s sF C u u C u u+ −= − − −                                              (1) 
where C is a proportionality constant. Once the force is determined, it is introduced into the 
equations of classical mechanics, for example, into Newton’s second law. In this way, a series of 
differential equations is obtained. If there are N particles in the chain, then N equations of the 
following form are obtained: 
2
1 12 2
s
s s s
um u u u
C t + −
∂
= + −
∂
                                                   (2) 
where m is the mass of particles and 1,2,...,s N= . In principle, if these equations are solved 
given the initial conditions, the mathematical expression that describes the motion of each atom 
in time can be computed. Mathematical details are not very important here, but we do want to 
highlight the picture about the dynamics of solids offered by this model: atoms are linked by 
interactions that allow them to vibrate about their equilibrium position. In this way, the vibrations 
in the crystal lattice form waves that propagate through the crystal, by means of which sound and 
temperature are transported. 
2.2. Quantum solids and the birth of the concept of phonon. 
The problem about the ontological status of phonons arises because the classical description of 
crystalline solids, offered in the previous section, is not enough to explain the phenomena that 
can be measured in laboratory. In particular, the dependence of the heat capacity on temperature 
cannot be explained by the mechanical model. As we will see, in order to account for this kind of 
phenomena, the introduction of a new entity was required: the phonon. 
Let us carefully analyze how phonons are introduced. Since empirical evidence suggests 
that vibrations are quantized, it is necessary to quantize the model. By assuming that the atoms 
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only interact with their first neighbors, and on the basis of the fact that the inter-atomic forces are 
equal to those of the harmonic oscillator, quantizing the model is extremely simple and the 
Hamiltonian Hˆ  can be written as  
( )22 1
1
1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
2 2
N
s s s
s
CH p q q
m +=
= + −∑                                                   (3) 
where ˆ sp  and ˆsq  are the momentum and position operators from s , respectively, and 1ˆsq +  is the 
position operator from particle 1s + . Since the total number N of particles is a really huge 
number, of the order of 2310 , solving the Hamiltonian as it is expressed is impossible in practice. 
As a consequence, a strategy that simplifies the calculation is used. The first step is to make a 
very specific coordinate change, to the so-called phononic coordinates: 
1/2
1
ˆ ˆ
N
iksa
k s
s
Q N q e− −
=
= ∑    1/2
1
ˆ ˆ
N
iksa
k s
s
P N p e−
=
= ∑            (4) 
where 1 12k nN aπ − −=  and 0, 1,..., / 2n N= ± . In these coordinates the Hamiltonian is written as a 
sum of harmonic oscillators that do not interact: 
( )2 2 21 ˆˆ ˆ2 n n nnH P Qω= +∑
                            (5) 
where ( ) ( )1/2 1/22 / m 1 cos( )n nC k aω = −  is the angular frequency of the oscillator n . The result so 
obtained shows that the system can be represented by the Hamiltonian corresponding to the sum 
of many independent harmonic oscillators. Therefore, the formalism based on creation and 
destruction operators originally developed for the harmonic oscillator can be used (Sakurai 1994). 
In this formalism vibrations can be represented as particles that are created and destroyed, where 
the quantity of particles increases as a function of the increase of the vibrational magnitude. Thus, 
some states of the system can be represented by means of a state n , where n is a integer that 
represents the number of particles in the system. The creation operator †aˆ , when applied to a 
state of the system with n  particles, returns another state with 1n +  particles, that is, creates a 
particle. In turn, the destruction operator aˆ  destroys a particle. 
† 1a n n= +    1a n n= −                 (6) 
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On the basis of this representation, the Hamiltonian can be expressed in terms of the creation and 
the destruction operators as follows: 
† 1ˆ ˆ ˆ
2k k kk
H a aω ⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑h                           (7) 
Although this Hamiltonian is the same Hamiltonian of eq. (3), in this representation the atoms 
originally introduced to constitute chain no longer appear in the model. The new expression 
represents a new type of particle called phonon. Then, the original mechanical picture can be left 
aside, to move to a model where there are no atoms in motion, but only phonons. From this 
perspective, the total energy of the crystal is the sum of the energy of the phonons plus a 
“vacuum” energy associated with the case in which there are no phonons in the network. Indeed, 
1
2 vacu
m
m m m m um
m m m
E n nε ω ε ε⎛ ⎞= = + = +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑h                                      (8) 
where mε  is the energy of a phonon whose frequency is mω , mn  is the number of phonons whose 
frequency is mω  and vacuumε  is the vacuum energy. 
3. Explanation and prediction by means of phonons. 
In the previous section we showed that, by means of a series of calculations, it is possible to 
begin from the Hamiltonian of a system consisting of atoms that vibrate by interacting with their 
first neighbors, and to arrive to the Hamiltonian of a system composed of phonons. However, the 
relevance of the model based on phonons, and what makes the question about the ontological 
issue of phonons so urgent, is the fact that the model is indispensable for the study of the 
properties of crystalline. In particular, phonons play a central role in explaining the physical and 
chemical properties of salts. As an example, we present here two simple cases in which the 
explanatory and predictive power of the concept of phonon can be acknowledged. 
3.1. The heat equation. 
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In the description of crystalline solids, the temperature of the solid is explained microscopically 
by the presence of phonons; the higher the density of phonons, the higher the temperature. To 
illustrate this idea, let us consider a metal bar heated at one of its ends and cooled at the other: 
heat will flow from the hot end to the cold end, producing a temperature gradient. If the phonon 
model is used for the microscopic explanation, then the situation is described in terms of a source 
of phonons at the hot end, which travel through the metal bar toward the cold end. In their 
motion, phonons collide with each other, generating a process of diffusion that ends with the 
destruction of the phonons at the cold end. 
 
In a metal bar with a hot end (left), where phonons are created, and a cold end (right), where 
phonons are destroyed, there is a net flow of phonons from the hot end to the cold end. As the 
density of phonons represents the temperature, the phonon diffusive process explains the 
temperature gradient along the bar. 
 
In this way, phonons offer a microscopic model of heat flow and temperature gradient based on 
particles. This model is explanatory simple and very effective, since gives an easy picture of 
thermal phenomena. In fact, it is surprising that the application of quantum mechanics to 
crystalline solids ends up recovering a conception of heat similar to that developed by Lavoisier 
in the thirteenth century with his theory of caloric (Best 2016). In effect, phonons would be a 
modern and quantized version of the notion of the substance of heat.  
On the other hand, at the mathematical level, the effectiveness of the model of phonons 
becomes clear by the fact that it allows deducing the well-known heat equation in a simple way 
as follows. If collisions are taken into account, the net flow of energy along the longitudinal 
direction x of the bar is computed as 
1
3U
dTj Cvl
dx
= −                                                              (9) 
where C is the thermal capacity per unit volume, v is the average velocity of the phonons, and l is 
the average free path of a phonon between collisions (for a detailed analysis of the deduction of 
the heat equation, see Ashcroft and Mermin 1976). Independently of the details of the derivation, 
Net flow of phonons 
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it is interesting to notice that the constants appearing in the equation, which have no clear 
interpretation in the traditional view, acquire a precise meaning in the model of phonons: for 
example, when interpreted in the light of the phonon model, the heat equation shows that there is 
a directly proportional relation between the velocity of phonons and the propagation of heat 
3.2. The heat capacity. 
Another interesting example that reinforces the richness and epistemic potential of the concept of 
phonon is the calculation of the heat capacity of solids. In this case, let us consider that phonons 
are confined within an isolated crystal without sources or sinks. The system can be thus modeled 
as an ideal gas of phonons confined in a box. On this basis, the total energy of the crystal can be 
written as the sum of the energy of each of the phonons  
m
m
m
E nε=∑                                                              (10) 
where mn  is the average occupation number for phonons of energy 
mε , which is given by the 
Planck distribution 
1
1
m
B
m
k T
n
e
ω=
−
h                                                            (11) 
where Bk  is the Boltzmann constant and T is the absolute temperature. Then, the specific heat of 
the crystal Ccrystal  is computed as 
Ccrystal =
∂U
∂T
                                                             (12) 
Due to the complexity of the calculation, certain approximations are usually applied. In the case 
of low temperatures, the Debye approximation is used and the result is proportional to the cube of 
the temperature (for the details of the derivation, see Kittel 2005) 
3
cristalC T∝                                                              (13) 
In the case of high temperatures, the Einstein approach is used, and the thermal capacity results 
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h                                                      (14) 
These equations, deduced from the phononic formalism, fit excellently to the results obtained in 
the laboratory. For example, the results of the thermal capacity of diamond obtained 
experimentally are contrasted with the results computed by means of the phononic formalism 
leading to the above equations. A similar situation occurs with the thermal capacity solid argon. 
In this case, the agreement between experimental and theoretical results is more than acceptable, 
it is excellent. 
The previous cases are only two of the many applications that show that the phonon 
formalism is not a mere calculation curiosity; on the contrary, it is a successful model to explain 
the phenomena associated with solids, which has demonstrate a high empirical success and 
explanatory power.  
4. The ontological status of phonons. 
In the previous sections we have recalled the mathematical derivation of phonons and have 
stressed their explanatory power. However, such epistemic virtues do not supply sufficient 
grounds to justify the existence of phonons. Precisely, the anti-realist tradition appeals to the 
well-known pessimistic meta-induction argument to claim that pragmatic success does not prove 
the truth of the theory nor, therefore, the effective existence of the entities postulated by it. Aware 
of this argument, in this section we will try to argue, perhaps not against scientific anti-realism 
but against a certain type of realism, that if one adopts a realistic attitude in science, there is no 
reason to consider phonons as non-existing entities. For this purpose, we will follow two 
strategies: first, we will consider the analogy between phonons and photons, and, second, we will 
refute the usual arguments by which phonons are commonly considered useful tools but unreal 
entities. 
4.1. Phonon, a cousin of photon. 
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In Subsection 2.2, we have shown how, by means of a series of calculations it is possible to start 
from the Hamiltonian of vibrating atoms and to arrive to the Hamiltonian of a system composed 
of phonons in the following way: 
( )2 2 2 . †i   t  n 1 1ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ2 2
Coordenadas fonónicas op creación y destrucció
atoms m m m m m m
m m
nH H P Q a aω ω ⎛ ⎞+ ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯→ + ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯→ +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑h  (15) 
where 2
1
1ˆ ˆ
2
N
atoms s
s
H p
m=
=∑  and ( )2int 1
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ
2
N
s s
s
CH q q+
=
= −∑ .  
This formal operation is highly relevant for the purpose of the present work, due to the complete 
analogy that can be traced between phonons and photons. In fact, the calculations used to find the 
phononic Hamiltonian are exactly the same as those used to find the Hamiltonian of photons. 
Starting from the Hamiltonian of the electric ˆ EH  and magnetic field ˆ BH , we formal strategy in 
the case of photons is: 
( ) .   2 2 2 †1 1ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ2 2E
Coordenadas fotónicas op creación y destrucción
B m m m m m m
m m
H H P Q a aω ω ⎛ ⎞+ ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯→ + ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯→ +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑h  (16) 
As it easy to see, the formal analogy between the derivation of photons and the derivation of 
phonons is complete; then, it is legitimate to ask why we phonons are endowed with the fictional 
or degraded status of quasi-particles. If the procedure of the expression (16) allows us to 
understand all forms of electromagnetic radiation in terms of particles, why does the procedure of 
expression (15) not allow us to understand all forms of vibration in a crystal under the same 
terms? Or, in other words, what are the assumptions that prevent us to say that the temperature 
and the sound in a crystal are manifestations of the real presence of phonons? 
Summing up, in the case of photons, by beginning from the electromagnetic field, certain 
calculations lead to the expressions that can be easily interpreted in terms of particles named 
photons. Subsequently, and due to the empirical success of the models based on photons, they 
acquire the status of real particles. However, in the case of phonons, although exactly the 
analogous calculations are performed and an equivalent empirical success is reached, the same 
conclusion is not drawn. In fact, these particles are usually considered as pseudo-particles or 
quasi-particles (Ladyman 2015, Franklin & Knox 2018). In the following subsections we will 
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critically assess the reasons that commonly underlie this different attitude. In particular, we will 
try to elucidate whether the different arguments usually directed against the non-existence of 
phonons are powerful enough to draw such a conclusion. 
4.2. Two ontologies for matter.  
When a picture and a mathematical formalism to describe the composition of chemical 
substances is needed, definitely the most popular model is that offered by the usual atomic 
model, according to which matter is composed of atoms in motion, and in whose context 
chemical phenomena are explained in terms of atoms and their interaction. An atom is classically 
conceived as a composite particle whose set of properties includes position and velocity. This 
idea, when applied to the case of a crystalline solid, leads to the model of the chain of interacting 
atoms as presented in Section 2. Thus, in order to apply quantum mechanics to a chemical 
substance under this model, it is necessary to define its Hamiltonian as the Hamiltonian of these 
component atoms plus the interaction Hamiltonian: 
int
ˆ ˆ ˆ
U atomsH H H= +                             (17) 
If some approximations are applied to this Hamiltonian, many natural phenomena can be 
predicted and explained. For example, the energy levels of a molecule can be computed (Sutcliffe 
and Woolley 2012). 
On the other hand, in Section 2 we presented a different ontology for the case of solid state 
matter based on the phononic model. According to that model, solids are composed of atoms at 
rest and phonons in motion. In turn, the Hamiltonian of the phonons plus the interaction 
Hamiltonian can be defined 
int
ˆ ˆ ˆ
U phononsH H H ʹ= +                             (18) 
With these Hamiltonians many natural phenomena can also be predicted and explained. For 
example, the heat equation can be computed. 
Although a relevant empirical success is obtained by the application of the two models, the 
preference for the atomic hypothesis about the constitution of matter prevails over the phononic 
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hypothesis in the scientific community. One may ask for the reasons underlying this choice. In 
the following paragraphs we critically analyze three arguments that can be used to support the 
usual atomic hypothesis: 
• The “tool argument” points out that the atomic hypothesis is originally used to introduce 
phonons (see equation 15). Therefore, phonons must be interpreted as a mere tool that 
simplifies the calculations that cannot be directly solved in the atomic model. 
• The “supercomputer argument” claims that we are forced to use the phononic model because 
we do not have yet sufficient computing power to solve the Schrödinger equation of a 
crystalline network from first principles. The assumption is that, in the future, when we will 
count with more powerful computers, we will be able to perform the exact calculations with no 
need to appeal to phonons. 
• The “explanation argument” asserts hat the usual atomic model, unlike the phononic model, 
can explain a great variety of phenomena. Due to their different explanatory capacity, both 
models are not at the same level. 
The three arguments are intertwined, since the explanation argument only makes sense either by 
conceiving phonons as mere calculation tools, or by clinging to the hope that in the near future 
we will have sufficient computing power to do without phonons. However, for reasons of 
argumentative clarity, we will treat them independently. 
4.3.1. The tool argument. 
According to the tool argument, on the basis of the model of a chain of atoms that vibrate about 
their equilibrium position, phonons are introduced with the only purpose of simplifying 
calculations. In fact, starting from the atoms model was the strategy followed in Section 2 (it is 
also the way in which phonons appear in the textbooks on the subject; see, e.g., Ashcroft and 
Mermin 1976, Kittel 2005). However, we followed this strategy only for didactic reasons: since 
the typical reader is familiar with the idea of atoms in motion, it is easier to begin with a model 
based on them. The relevant point is that those calculations based on the atomic model are not 
necessary: it is possible to directly introduce phonons with the Hamiltonian 
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† 1ˆ ˆ ˆ
2k k kk
H a aω ⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑h                           (19) 
In other words, the existence of phonons can be postulated from the very beginning, and, with 
them, the properties of crystalline solids can be explained. When this fact is kept in mind, the tool 
argument looses its strength: although the calculations are usually presented from atoms to 
phonons, they can be presented in the opposite direction, such that phonons appear as the 
fundamental entities.  
Our counterargument is further supported by the fact that the Hamiltonian of the atoms in 
motion can be obtained by departing from the phononic Hamiltonian. This means that, although 
there is a transformation that turns the atomic Hamiltonian into the phononic Hamiltonian, there 
is also an inverse transformation that turns the phononic Hamiltonian into the atomic 
Hamiltonian. Therefore, one might argue that phonons are the fundamental entities and atoms in 
motion are useful calculation tools for treating in problems that do not involve thermal 
phenomena. This shows that, since the situation is symmetric, the tool argument cannot be 
appealed to for supporting the ontological priority of one description matter over the other. It 
might be taken into account only as a complement in the case that other arguments for the 
ontological priority of the atoms model were available. If it could be proved, on the basis of other 
arguments, that the fundamental ontology of matter is one based on atoms in motion, then the 
tool argument would explain why using phonons is sometimes convenient. 
So far we have shown that the two presentation strategies, phonons obtained from atoms 
and atoms obtained from phonons, are equally legitimate. But this view is valid only in a 
particular case, the case of non-interacting phonons. In fact, in Section 2, the phonons appearing 
at the end of the derivation do not interact with each other. This means that the argument that 
begins by atoms leads to the very idealized case of phonons that do not interact with each other. 
But, when phonons are used to describe some phenomenon in a crystal in the general case, a 
phononic interaction term is introduced in the phononic Hamiltonian of eq. (19). For example, 
the dependence of electrical resistivity with temperature is explained by considering that the 
electrons that move in a conductive material collide with and are dispersed by the phonons of the 
crystal lattice: the higher the temperature, the more number of phonons in the material, and 
consequently more collisions occur. The electron-phonon coupling constant is measured in 
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laboratory, and from this constant the number of phonons surrounding an electron that moves 
within a crystal is computed: in this way, the type of interaction between the involved particles 
can be determined (Kittel 2005). This phenomenon is explained by assuming the existence of 
both electrons and phonons, and by admitting that particles of those these two kinds interact with 
each other: the interaction Hamiltonian that accounts for this interaction is built in order to 
account for the results of experiments, as usual in physics. Summing up, the dependence of 
electrical resistivity with temperature is explained by taking phonons, not atoms, as the starting 
point. 
The same happens in the experiment carried out by Shinen (1963) on magnesium oxide 
crystals, where a scattering process between phonons can be observed. Shinen describes a 
situation in which, as a consequence of the cross-linking between two beams of phonons with 
frequency 1ω  and 2ω , a third phonon beam is produced with frequency 1 2ω ω+ . This 
phenomenon led him to think that, when a phonon with frequency 1ω  collides with a phonon 
with frequency 2ω  in a scattering process where energy is conserved, a third phonon with 
frequency 1 2ω ω+  is produced. The scattering between the two beams is the consequence of the 
interaction between phonons; that is, Hamiltonian of phonons must be added an interaction 
Hamiltonian: 
†
int int
1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
2k k k phononsk
H a a H H H⎛ ⎞= + + = +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑hω                 (20) 
The interaction Hamiltonian has the directly interpretation as the Hamiltonian that accounts for 
the interaction between phonons. Moreover, it is measured in the experiments in laboratory. Only 
a posteriori, in certain cases the phononic interaction Hamiltonian can be reformulated in the 
context of the atomic model, that is, it can be computed by means of the introduction of an extra, 
non-quadratic term in the Hamiltonian of the atomic model given by eq. (3). But even when such 
a reformulation is possible, the non-quadratic term in the atomic interaction Hamiltonian lacks a 
direct interpretation: the interaction between atoms represented by that quadratic term has no 
clear physical meaning. It might be argued that the atomic model is a mere calculation tool and, 
consequently, the atomic interaction Hamiltonian turns out to be an artifact derived from the real 
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phononic description. A similar example can be found in Kong et al. (2001), where the phonon-
electron coupling in magnesium boride crystals is computed. 
The cases described above show that, although in the particular case of non-interacting 
phonons the position according to which phonons are mere calculation tools might be defended, 
in the general case such a position becomes untenable. Recall that, according to the tool 
argument, phonons must be interpreted in an instrumental way since derived from atoms. 
However, in the case where phonons interact with each other, the roles are reversed: physicists 
begin with phonons, work with phonons, make experiments with phonons, determine the 
Hamiltonian interaction of phonons, and finally, just at the end of the process, eventually they 
translate the obtained results in terms of atoms in motion. In other words, in the generic case, the 
phonons model is the working methodology, used to pose the problem from the beginning and to 
design the experiments. Therefore, atoms should be conceived as mere calculation tools without 
real reference. 
Thus, we consider that the analogy between phonons and photons established in Subsection 
4.1, and the fact that the phononic hypothesis can be considered as a “first principle”, undermine 
the defense of the realists who, accepting the existence of photons, maintain a skeptical attitude 
toward phonons. Therefore, we are faced to the following dichotomy: either we adopt a general 
instrumentalist view for all entities, or we accept phonons as existing entities. 
4.3.2. The supercomputer argument. 
This argument insists in that phonons are calculation tools that could be discarded if we had 
enough computing power to solve the Schrödinger equation of crystals from first principles in an 
exact way. Let’s consider this new argument in more detail. 
Given a quantum system U, according to quantum mechanics it has a Hamiltonian 
associated ˆUH , and there are many legitimate ways to divide U into parts. In particular, it is 
always possible to add and subtract an arbitrary ˆ XH , so that the original Hamiltonian remains the 
same: 
int
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
U X X U XH H H H H H= − + = +                 (21) 
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where intˆ ˆ ˆX UH H H= − + . This is a highly artificial but correct procedure, which shows that any 
Hamiltonian can always be written as a given self-Hamiltonian plus some interaction term. The 
fact that this can always be done does not mean, as we will see later, that it is always useful. 
On the basis of the above remark, the Hamiltonian of a crystal can be quantum-
mechanically represented as the Hamiltonian of atoms in motion plus an interaction Hamitonian, 
int
ˆ ˆ ˆ
U atomsH H H= + ,  or as the Hamiltonian of phonons plus an interaction Hamiltonian different 
from that of the atomic case, int
ˆ ˆ ˆ 'U phononsH H H= + . It is important to note that up to now all the 
Hamiltonians are exact, since no approximation was introduced yet. In the hypothetical case of 
having a supercomputer that, following the supercomputer argument, allowed us to obtain exact 
solutions for systems of many equations, then we could use it to solve the equations based on the 
atomic Hamiltonian and to calculate, for example, the expectation value of a certain observable 
Oˆ . However, nothing prevents us from using the same supercomputer to solve the equatios based 
on the phononic Hamiltonian, and to calculate the expectation value of the same observable Oˆ . 
In both cases, because exact Hamiltonians are used and exact solutions are computed, we would 
obtain exactly the same result. 
ˆ ˆ
atoms phonons
O O=                          (22) 
Summing up, although it is true that with a supercomputer we can exactly describe any 
problem with the atomic model, it is also true that we can do the same, and with the same 
effectiveness, with the phononic model: the supercomputer is neutral in this. Therefore, the 
asymmetric conclusion drawn by the supercomputer argument, according to which atoms exist 
but phonons do not, is not acceptable, and the argument loses any strength. 
4.3.3. The explanation argument. 
According to this argument, the ontological priority of atoms in motion over phonons is due to 
the fact that, by contrast to the latter, the former explain a large number of phenomena. 
Let us recall that the Hamiltonian of any crystalline material can be expressed according to 
the atomic model and to the phononic model: 
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int int
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 'U atoms phononsH H H H H= + = +                       (23) 
We have seen that if we had a supercomputer, then we could calculate the exact solutions in both 
cases, obtaining the same results. But, what happens if we do not have the supercomputer? 
If, as it is the case, we do not have the supercomputer, then we are forced to introduce some 
kind of approximations. The most common approaches are always variations of the traditional 
perturbation theory (Ballentine 1990), which requires that the self-Hamiltonian is much larger 
than the interaction Hamiltonian. Therefore, the requirement to apply the perturbation theory to 
the Hamiltonian in the atomic model is that intˆ ˆatomsH H? : if this requirement is met, then 
approximate solutions can be obtained and the expectation value ˆ
atoms
O  of a certain observable 
Oˆ  can be computed. Analogously, the requirement to apply the perturbation theory to the 
Hamiltonian in the phononic model is that intˆ ˆ 'phononsH H? : once again, if this requirement is 
met, then approximate solutions can be obtained and the expectation value ˆ
phonons
O  of the same 
observable Oˆ  can be computed. However, unlike what happens in the case of the exact solution 
presented in the previous section, in this case the results are not the same: 
ˆ ˆ
átomos fonones
O O≠                          (24) 
This is due to the fact that the two expectation values are obtained by means of approximate 
solutions. Therefore, one result may be is better than the other, and this can only be decided 
experimentally. Precisely, in general the perturbation theory cannot be applied to the two 
Hamiltonians, since the requirements intˆ ˆatomsH H?  and intˆ ˆ 'phononsH H?  in general cannot be 
satisfied at the same time. As a consequence, in the generic case the atomic model or the 
phononic model can be applied, but not both.  
The above remark means that, although it is true that without a supercomputer assisting us 
the atomic model is successful in many cases, it is also true that in many other cases it does not 
work. In the case of thermal processes, the phononic model must be used, not by whim, but by 
necessity. It does not matter that the list of applications of the atomic model is longer than that of 
the phononic model: they complement each other since both are indispensable when the goal is to 
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explain all phenomena. In fact, when one model cannot be applied, the other applies. The 
phononic model is essential because the atomic model is not universally applicable.  
The explanation argument might gain strength if it received additional theoretical support 
from the other two arguments previously considered. However, this does not happen because, as 
we have shown, they are not adequate or effective to deny the existence of phonons. 
5. Therefore, phonons exist. But how do they exist? 
Up to this point we have argues that there are good reasons to accept phonons as really existing 
entities. However, there is still a long way to understand the effective ontological status of 
phonons. In the current philosophical literature, the prevailing realist position about phonons 
relies on emergentism. For instance, in the paper “Are there individuals in physics, and if so, 
what are they?”, James Ladyman conceives phonons as quasi-particles, where quasi-particles are 
entities with a finite life time and therefore always related to a limited time scale (2015: 202). On 
the other hand, although in the line of Ladyman’s proposal, Alexander Franklin and Eleanor 
Knox (2018) develop in their paper “Emergence without limits: the case of phonons” develop a 
purely emergentist proposal to understand the case of phonons. From their perspective, the 
fundamental entities inhabit a basal level, from which the entities that cannot be explained from 
the behavior of the basal level emerge. Phonons are entities that emerge from the basal level 
populated by atoms. 
Although the emergentist view is very appealing, is faces a serious difficulty. The particular 
case of phonons, as Franklin and Knox (2018) themselves admit, is a strange kind of emergence. 
Usually, at least in physics, the emergence scheme is supported by the fact that the concepts of 
the involved theories are linked by some singular or asymptotic limit. It is precisely those kinds 
of limit what introduces the asymmetry indispensable for emergence. In fact, in spite of the many 
conceptions about emergence, everybody accepts that emergence is an asymmetric relation: if A 
emerges from B, then B does not emerge from A. In the case of phonons, by contrast, there are 
no limits relating the atomic model and the phononic model. Furthermore, as explained in detail 
in the previous section, the two models stand in symmetric relations in several senses. Whereas 
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there is a transformation that turns the atomic Hamiltonian into the phononic Hamiltonian, there 
is also an inverse transformation that turns the phononic Hamiltonian into the atomic 
Hamiltonian. Although it is true that a supercomputer could exactly solve any problem with the 
atomic model, it is also true that it could do the same, and with the same effectiveness, with the 
phononic model. In turn, the atomic model is successful in many cases but does not work in 
many others, precisely in those where the phononic model is successful. Given the strong 
parallelism between the two models, where does the asymmetry required by emergence comes 
from? 
Of course, conceiving phonons as entities emergent from atoms is not a contradictory 
stance. However, the ontological priority of atoms over phonons is introduced as a metaphysical 
assumption, which is supported neither by the formal theory of phonons nor by the experimental 
practice in physics. Therefore, those who want to avoid those non-scientifically founded 
metaphysical assumptions may prefer a pluralist perspective that rejects hierarchical relations 
between levels. 
Scientific pluralism, in its ontological version, has been proposed by several authors such 
as Dupré (1993), Cartwright (1994, 1999), Chakravartty (2011), and Lombardi and Pérez 
Ranzanz (2014). Despite this, the pluralist perspective is in general very resisted in the scientific 
community, and even by many philosophers of science. Although scientific practice witnesses an 
increasing proliferation of models configured from theoretical principles in conflict (Hendry 
1998), or even incompatible models applied to the same system of study, a reductionist, monistic 
and universalist view prevails in science, as a product of what Scerri (2000) called the 
“imperialism of physics”. 
The roots if this situation can be found in the fact that the traditional philosophy of science 
was constituted as a field of inquiry by taking the evolution of physics as its model, that is, a 
discipline characterized by trying to provide a unified and integral vision of the world. This may 
explain the widespread tendency of trying to explain the multiplicity of existing things by means 
of an economic and simple ontology. However, not only regarding the interdisciplinary relations 
the reductionist project has faced insurmountable obstacles as a consequence of the impossibility 
of translating the concepts coming from different scientific disciplines. Also within physics itself 
similar obstacles appear. It is in this context that pluralism becomes strong because, as Chang 
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asserts, the best reason to be pluralist is that it is not very likely that we will achieve an accurate 
theory that meets all our needs; and if it is not so, maintaining multiple systems makes much 
sense (Chang 2012: 20).  
Carwright does not advocate only for an epistemic pluralism; by taking seriously what 
scientific practice suggests, she asserts: “as appearances suggest, we live in a dappled world, a 
world rich in different things, with different natures, behaving in different ways. The laws that 
describe this world are a patchwork, not a pyramid ” (Carwright 1999: 01). In agreement with 
this pluralist stance, although from a slightly different philosophical approach, Olimpia Lombardi 
and Ana Rosa Pérez Ransanz ascribe to a Kantian-inspired ontological pluralism that retain the 
realist requirement of a correspondentist conception of truth: “rejecting metaphysical realism 
does not imply rejecting truth as correspondence. (…) a Kantian-rooted realism is able to 
preserve a notion of truth as correspondence” (Lombardi and Pérez Ransanz 2012, p. 50). From 
this perspective, the simultaneous existence of incompatible entities and/or properties can be 
asserted whenever it is done from different conceptual schemes. In continuity with certain 
fundamental aspects of Carnap’s position (1950), and inspired by Putnam (1981), the authors 
assume that the question of what really exists only makes sense in an internal framework, in the 
context of the ontological domain defined by a scientific successful theory. Thus, the theories of 
science do not describe a transcendental reality that waits to be discovered as it is in itself. On the 
contrary, each scientifically successful conceptual scheme constitutes its own ontology, so the 
problem “is not to establish what actually exists; the problem is to accept that what we call 
‘object’ is constituted within our categorical scheme, thus it is an «object for us»” (Lombardi and 
Pérez Ransanz 2012: 23). Whereas a monist and reductionist position only accepts a single 
reality, the pluralist position implies not only that there is no absolute reality, but that there are 
multiple realities relative to the conceptual schemes of the different successful theories of 
science.  
The present discussion about phonons is not the first time that ontological pluralism is 
considered in the field of chemistry. According to a traditional reductionist view, eminently anti-
pluralist, the entities raised by chemistry, although with some explanatory efficiency, are merely 
apparent since resulting from an approximate description of the only true world described by 
quantum physics. However, the reductionist position disagrees with the effective scientific 
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practice. For instance, incompatible assumptions coexist in quantum chemistry, coming from 
structural chemistry and quantum mechanics, and none of them are dispensable. In particular, 
certain concepts of classical structural chemistry, such as the notion of molecular structure, are so 
essential for chemical practice that even when a mathematical reduction were possible, the 
resources of structural chemistry would still be absolutely indispensable. The case of optical 
isomerism, in turn, shows that even if we could calculate the exact Hamiltonian of a system, from 
such information we would not be able to obtain the precise structure that allows us to 
differentiate the dextrorotatory from the levorotatory molecules (for more details see Lombardi 
2014, Fortin, Lombardi and Martínez González 2017, 2018a, 2018b). Ontological pluralism faces 
this situation by admitting that quantum chemistry is an autonomous discipline with its own 
ontology (see Lombardi y Labarca 2005, 2010) 
On the basis of the arguments developed in the previous sections, the case of phonons can 
also be interpreted in a pluralistic philosophical framework, so that both the phononic and the 
atomic descriptions, even if incompatible with each other, are equally valid in their respective 
contexts. If a supercomputer existed, any system could be described with both models. And in the 
actual case in which such a supercomputer does not exist, the two descriptions remain equally 
valid in their respective fields of application. Therefore, both descriptions of reality must be 
accepted as equally valid.  
From a pluralistic perspective, scientific ontology is context-dependent. In certain contexts, 
we should admit an ontology of mobile atoms since it allows us to explain a series of phenomena. 
But assuming such an interpretation in certain explanatory contexts should not limit or cancel 
other interpretive contexts. The phononic picture of reality, according to which atoms are at rest 
and many phenomena are the result of the motion of phonons, is another non-exclusive 
successful interpretation. As Cartwright claims, “all evidence points to the conclusion that I 
really like –that Nature is not reductive and single-minded. It is rich and diverse” (1994: 361).  
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6. Conclusions. 
The main aim of this work has been to discuss the ontological status of phonons, usually 
discredited in physics as mere calculation tools. For this purpose, first we recalled the epistemic 
virtues of such entities, not only their explanatory power but also their interpretive capability 
with respect to certain phenomena that remain obscure from other theoretical views.  
Then we argued that there are not good reasons to conceive phonons as non-existing 
entities. To reach this goal we first established an analogy between photons and phonons, so that 
anyone who accepts photons as existing entities should also accept phonons in the same sense. 
Second, we examined three arguments that are often used to explain the ontological primacy of 
atoms over phonons: the tool argument, the supercomputer argument and the explanation 
argument. By showing the weaknesses of those arguments, we undermined the views of those 
who, from a realist position, nevertheless deny the real existence of phonons. 
Finally, having already rejected the reductionist position, we considered two possible ways 
of interpreting the ontological status of phonons. On the one hand, the emergentist perspective 
proposed by certain authors for the case of phonons	is faced to the difficulties derived from the 
symmetric relations linking the atomic and the phononic models, which turn the asymmetry of 
emergence into a metaphysical postulate. On the other hand, ontological pluralism have the 
resources to cope with the conceptual problems derived from the case of phonons, with no need 
to postulate a hierarchical relationship between the different domains of reality. 
References 
Amann, A. (1992). “Must a molecule have a shape?” South African Journal of Chemistry 45: 29-
38. 
Ashcroft, N. W. y Mermin, N. D. (1976). Solid State Physics. Orlando: Harcourt College 
Publishers.  
Bishop, R. (2005). “Patching physics and chemistry together.” Philosophy of Science 72: 716-
722. 
	 23	
Born, M. and Oppenheimer, J. (1927). “Zur Quantentheorie der Molekeln.” Annalen der Physik 
84: 457-484.  
Ballentine, L. E. (1990). Quantum Mechanics. New York: Prentice Hall. 
Best, N. W. (2016). “Lavoisier's 'Reflections on Phlogiston' II: On the nature of heat.” 
Foundations of Chemistry 18: 3-13. 
Carnap, R. (1950). “Empiricism, semantics, and ontology.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 
4: 20-40. Reprinted in the Supplement to Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and 
Modal Logic, enlarged edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. 
Cartwright, N. (1994). “The metaphysics of the disunified world.” Proceedings of the Biennial 
Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 2: 357-364. 
Cartwright, N. (1999). The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science. Cambridge, 
CUP. 
Chakravartty, A. (2011). “Scientific realism and ontological relativity.” The Monist 94: 157-180. 
Chang, H. (2012). Is Water H2O? Evidence, Realism and Pluralism. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Dupré, J. (1993). The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science. 
Cambridge MA: HUP. 
Fortin, S., Lombardi, O. and Martínez González, J. C. (2017). “The relationship between 
chemistry and physics from the perspective of Bohmian mechanics.” Foundations of 
Chemistry 19: 43-59. 
Fortin, S., Lombardi, O. and Martínez González, J. C. (2018a). “Why molecular structure cannot 
be strictly reduced to quantum mechanics.” Foundations of Chemistry on line first, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10698-018-9310-2. 
Fortin, S., Lombardi, O. y Martínez González, J. C. (2018b). “A new application of the modal-
Hamiltonian interpretation of quantum mechanics: the problem of optical isomerism.” 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 62: 123-135. 
Franklin, A. y Eleanor Knox (2018). “Emergence without limits: The case of phonons.” PhilSci-
Archive: Preprints in Philosophy of Science, http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13397. 
	 24	
Hendry, R. F. (1998). “Models and approximation in quantum chemistry.” Poznan Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science and the Humanities 63:123- 142. 
Hendry, R. F. (2010) “Ontological reduction and molecular structure.” Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41: 
183-91. 
Hettema, H (2012). Reducing Chemistry to Physics. Limits, Models, Consequences, Groningen: 
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. 
Kittel, C. (2005). Introduction to Solid State Physics (Eighth edition). New York: John Wiley and 
Sons. 
Kong, Y., Dolgov, O. V., Jepsen, O. and Andersen, O. K. (2001). “Electron-phonon interaction in 
the normal and superconducting states of MgB2.” Physical Review B 64: 020501. 
Labarca, M. and Lombardi, O. (2010). “Why orbitals do not exist?” Foundations of Chemistry 
12: 149-157. 
Ladyman, J. (2015). “Are there individuals in physics, and if so, what are they?” In A. Guay and 
T. Pradeu (eds.), Individuals across the Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Lombardi, O. and Labarca, M. (2005). “The ontological autonomy of the chemical world.” 
Foundations of Chemistry 7: 125-148. 
Lombardi, O. and Pérez Ransanz, A. R. (2012). Los Múltiples Mundos de la Ciencia. Un 
Realismo Pluralista y su Aplicación a la Filosofía de la Física. México: UNAM-Siglo 
XXI. 
Lombardi, O. (2014). “Linking chemistry with physics: arguments and counterarguments.” 
Foundations of Chemistry 16: 181-192. 
Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sakurai, J. J. (1994). Modern Quantum Mechanics (Revised edition). Addison-Wesley: New 
York. 
Scerri, E. (2000). “The failure of reduction and how to resist disunity of the sciences in the 
context of chemical education.” Science & Education 9: 405-425. 
	 25	
Scerri, E. R. (2011). “Editorial 37.” Foundations of Chemistry 13: 1-7. 
Scerri, E. R. (2012). “Top-down causation regarding the chemistry-physics interface: a sceptical 
view.” Interface Focus 2: 20-25. 
Scerri, E. R. (2013). “Philosophy of chemistry: where has it been and where is it going.” In J.-P. 
Llored (ed.), The Philosophy of Chemistry: Practices, Methodologies, and Concepts. 
Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 
Shinen, N. S. (1963). “Nonlinear acoustic interaction in MgO at 9 Gc/sec.” Physical Review 
Letters 11: 3-6. 
Sutcliffe, B. T. and Woolley, R. G. (2011). “A comment on Editorial 37.” Foundations of 
Chemistry 13: 93-95. 
Sutcliffe, B. T. and Wolley, R. G. (2012). “Atoms and molecules in classical chemistry and 
quantum mechanics.” In R. F. Hendrya and A. Woody (eds.), Handbook of Philosophy of 
Science. Vol. 6, Philosophy of Chemistry. Oxford: Elsevier. 
Woolley, R. G. (1978). “Must a molecule have a shape?” Journal of the American Chemical 
Society 100: 1073-1078. 
Woolley, R. G. (1982). “Natural optical activity and the molecular hypothesis.” Structure and 
Bonding 52: 1-35. 
 
